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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Parties in the trial court included National Advertising Company ("National"), Gene 
V. Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford, dba Val-Dev, L.L.C. (the "Crawfords") and Murray 
City Corporation ("Murray City"). 
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I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Did the trial court correctly grant the Crawfords5 motion for leave to amend 
their answer to assert a counterclaim for damages? This order must not to be disturbed 
absent of a showing of an abuse of discretion. See R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., 
936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997). 
B. Did the trial court correctly find that National breached the Standard Lease 
Agreement (the "Lease")? This finding should not be set aside unless it was clearly 
erroneous. See Roderick v. Ricks. 2002 UT 84, f 2, 54 P.3d 1119. This finding is clearly 
erroneous only if it is not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination. See State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
C. Did the trial court correctly find that the Crawfords were entitled to damages? 
This finding should not be set aside unless it was clearly erroneous. See Roderick, 2002 UT 
at 84, J^ 2. This finding is clearly erroneous only if it is not adequately supported by the 
record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
A. Utah R. Civ. P. 13(d). See Addendum. 
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B. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). See Addendum. 
C. Utah R. Civ. P. 59. See Addendum. 
D. Utah R. Civ. P. 60. See Addendum. 
E. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(e). See Addendum. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves two competing permits for an outdoor advertising sign. The 
first belonged to the Crawfords. The second was subsequently issued to National. Because 
Murray City zoning ordinances preclude the simultaneous existence of both, one permit had 
to be invalidated. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
1. Proceedings Before the Crawfords Were Parties. 
National sued for a declaratory judgment that its permit was valid. R. 1-9. Before 
the Crawfords were parties, the trial court granted summary judgment for National. R. 
20-31, 78-81. The Crawfords' subsequent Motion to Reconsider was denied. R. 85-95, 
222-23. Later, National added the Crawfords as defendants by amendment and sought 
injunctive relief. R. 214-21. Once parties, the Crawfords requested summaiy judgment 
validating their permit. R. 229-41, 259-93. The motion was denied. R. 316-320. 
2. The First Appeal 
The trial court granted National's second motion for summary judgment, relying 
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on its initial rulings on the prior motions. R. 321-25, 348-51. This Court reversed this 
ruling in June of 1999. R. 387-389. The case was remitted on August 9, 1999. R. 385. 
3. The Second Appeal 
After remand, the Crawfords filed a second motion for summary judgment to 
validate their permit. R. 390-431, 443-48. National cross-moved for summary 
judgment. R. 432-442. The court granted the Crawfords' motion and denied National's 
on January 13, 2000. R. 452-53. However, the court later vacated its ruling to determine 
if service of process had properly occurred prior to the court's entry of summary 
judgment against the Crawfords in December 1996. R. 501-02. The trial court did so to 
address National's argument that the Crawfords had been properly served, that the trial 
court had jurisdiction over the Crawfords prior to its December 1996 ruling and, 
therefore, that the December 1996 ruling (which was reversed by this Court) was 
appropriate. R. 501-02. 
The trial court granted the Crawfords' subsequent motion for summary judgment 
on the issue of service of process. R. 650-54. This done, the court granted the 
Crawfords' second motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim and denied 
National's cross-motion. R. 675-77. National appealed. R. 678-79. This Court 
reversed, holding that summary judgment was precluded by issues of fact regarding 
service of process. R. 686-88. The Court then observed that "[sjhould the trial court 
find that sendee of process was not effectuated upon the Crawfords, NAC's claim 
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necessarily fails." R. 688. 
4. The Third Appeal 
After remand, the trial court held a trial on the issue of service of process. The 
parties stipulated this was the "sole issue to be determined at trial." R. 768. After 
considering the evidence, the trial court found that service of process was not effectuated 
upon the Crawfords. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Judgment and Order (the "Order") on August 2, 2002 R. 796-99. Consistent with this 
Court's December 6, 2001 observation that National's "necessarily fails," the trial court 
also dismissed National's complaint and entered judgment for the Crawfords on their 
counterclaim. R. 799. National appealed. R. 800-01. This Court affirmed and remitted 
the case on December 12, 2003. R. 809, 811-12. 
5. This Appeal 
On December 23, 2003, the Crawfords filed a Motion for Leave to File Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, in which they requested leave to amend their 
answer and assert a counterclaim for damages resulting from National's breach of the 
Lease. R. R. 814-20. The trial court granted the motion. R. 835-36. The trial court held 
a trial on October 19, 2004, after which it entered judgment for the Crawfords. R. 938. 
National appealed. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts set forth below are taken from the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law. R. 934-38. 
In December of 1974, National executed the Lease, which allowed it, as lessee, to 
construct and maintain an outdoor advertising sign on real property located at 
approximately 4982 South 300 West, Murray, Utah, along the 1-15 corridor (the 
"Property"). On January 6, 1995, the Crawfords granted their son, Brad Crawford, a 
general power of attorney. In December of 1995, Brad Crawford purchased the 
Property on his parents' behalf, who succeeded to the interests of the lessor under the 
Lease. R. 935. 
The initial term of the Lease was from February 1, 1975 to January 31, 1985. 
Subsequently, the Lease continued for an additional ten years, and thereafter from year to 
year, unless terminated by the lessor as of February 1 of any subsequent year upon at 
least sixty days written notice. R. 935. 
Paragraph 9 of the Lease states: 
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the 
Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction or 
remodeling, as evidenced by a building permit, requiring the removal of the 
Lessee's displays, the Lessor may terminate this lease upon giving the 
Lessee ninety (90) days written notice of termination, together with a copy 
of the building permit, by registered mail to either the Lessee's Home 
Office or the Branch Office listed, and upon the Lessor's refunding to the 
Lessee the rent previously paid for the unexpired portion of this lease 
beyond the termination date. The Lessee agrees to remove its displays 
within the 90 day period. 
Pursuant to paragraph 9, on April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified National that its sign 
must be removed from the Property (the "April 23 Notice"). On June 10, 1996, the 
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Crawfords notified National a second time that its sign must be removed from the 
Property (the "June 10 Notice"). On July 25, 1996, the Crawfords delivered to National a 
copy of the building permit for the construction referenced in the April 23 Notice and the 
June 10 Notice (the "Building Permit"). On August 7, 1996, the Crawfords notified 
National a third time that its sign must be removed from the Property (the "August 7 
Notice"). The April 23 Notice, the June 10 Notice and the August 7 Notice are referred 
to collectively as the "Notices." R. 935-36. 
On November 25, 1996, to avoid any argument that the Lease had not been 
terminated pursuant to paragraph 9, the Crawfords notified National in writing that the 
Lease would be terminated effective February 1, 1997 at the latest, pursuant to paragraph 
3. On March 29, 1996, Murray issued the Crawfords' Permit. Subsequently, Murray 
issued National's Permit and in February of 1997, National erected an outdoor advertising 
sign on property adjacent to the Property (the "Sign") which remained until September of 
2002. R. 936. 
Murray's zoning ordinances preclude the existence of both signs. On August 2, 
2002, this Court ruled that the Crawfords' Permit is valid and that National's Permit is 
"null and void." That ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals in a 
Memorandum Decision dated October 9, 2003. R. 936. 
After hearing the evidence presented at trial, the trial court: (1) found that National 
breached the Lease by not removing its sign from the Property by no later than October 
23, 1996, and instead applying for an obtaining a competing permit; (2) concluded that 
National's breach precluded the Crawfords from allowing another entity to erect an 
outdoor advertising sign on the Property and collecting a monthly rental fee from that 
entity; and (3) entered judgment for the Crawfords in the amount of $109,623.91. R. 938. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court had jurisdiction to grant the Crawfords' Motion for Leave to 
Amend. Although the motion did not specifically mention Utah R. Civ. P. 59 or 60, the 
trial court properly detemiined that reopening the judgment was appropriate under those 
rules. 
The trial court had broad discretion to grant the Crawfords' motion. The trial 
court's grant of the motion must not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that 
discretion resulting in prejudice to National. National has not made this showing. 
A counterclaim is not "mature" under Utah R. Civ. P. 13 until all the elements of 
the claim exist. The Crawfords' counterclaim did not mature, and the Crawfords could 
not pursue that counterclaim, until December 12, 2003. The Crawfords pursued their 
counterclaim 11 calendar days later. The trial court properly concluded that allowing the 
Crawfords to add their counterclaim was proper under these circumstances. 
The policy underlying Rule 13 is that closely related claims should be tried 
together to spare the parties and the judicial system the "diseconomies of multiple 
proceedings." If the trial court had not granted the Crawfords' motion, the Crawfords 
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would have had to file a separate lawsuit to assert their newly-mature claims. This 
multiplicity of actions is precisely what Rule 13 is intended to prevent. 
B. The trial court properly found that National breached the Lease. Paragraph 
9 of the Lease clearly states that if the Property was going to be improved such that the 
sign had to be removed, National had to remove it within 90 days of receiving written 
notice and a copy of the building permit. The Crawfords gave National written notice to 
remove its sign, and a copy of the building permit, by July 25, 1996. Thus, National had 
to remove its sign by October 23, 1996. National did not do so, but instead applied for 
and obtained a competing permit, which prevented the Crawfords from erecting their own 
sign and collecting rent from advertisers. Based on the foregoing, the trial court found 
that National breached the Lease. This finding is supported by evidence in the record. In 
fact, there was no contrary evidence introduced at trial. Thus, National has not met its 
burden of proving that the finding was clearly erroneous and, therefore, the finding must 
be affirmed. 
C. The trial court properly found that National's breach damaged the 
Crawfords. National had to remove its sign by October 23, 1996. The evidence 
presented at trial established that if National had done so, the Crawfords could have 
erected their own sign and collected lease payments beginning in November of 1996, 
which they were ready, willing and able to do. However, National refused to remove its 
sign by October 23,1996, and instead applied for and obtained a competing permit that 
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precluded the Crawfords from erecting their own sign until May of 2003. The trial court 
found that National was responsible for the resulting loss. This finding is supported by 
undisputed evidence in the record. Consequently, National failed to show that the trial 
court's finding was clearly erroneous. As a result, this finding should be affirmed. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE CRAWFORDS' 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND. 
1. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to Consider the Motion. 
National argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the Crawfords5 
Motion for Leave to Amend because the motion did not specifically refer to Utah R. Civ. 
P. 59 or 60, even though it satisfied the requirements of those rules.1 This argument 
contradicts the well-developed rule that "[t]he particular wording of a caption or title 
heading a document may or may not be complete or descriptive of the subject-matter 
included in the document" and that "[i]t is the subject-matter of a pleading, order, 
judgment, or decree that determines what it is regardless of the caption of the document." 
Lund v. Third Judicial Court. 90 Utah 433, 438, 62 P.2d 278, 280 (Utah 1936); see also 
Howard v. Howard. 11 Utah 2d 149, 152, 356 P.2d 275, 276 (Utah 1960) (same). 
Additionally, it runs contrary to Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d 27 (10th Cir. 1985), one of 
The Crawfords' motion was timely under Rules 59 or 60 as it was filed only 11 
calendar days after the Court of Appeals' remittitur. R. 809-10, 814-15. Additionally, the 
Crawfords' motion alleges: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect in 
discovering the new claims for damages; and/or (2) newly discovered evidence, which are 
grounds for reopening the judgment under Rules 59 and/or 60. 
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the cases upon which National relies. In Cooper, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to 
amend after dismissal of the initial complaint. Although the Tenth Circuit ultimately 
affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, it first considered whether reopening the 
judgment would have been appropriate under Rules 59 or 60, even though the plaintiff 
had not filed a motion under either of those mles. See id. at 29. Thus, Shumway actually 
stands for the proposition that a court should determine whether Rules 59 and 60 have 
been satisfied even if the moving party has not specifically referred to those mles. 
National's reliance on Glenn v. First National Bank, 868 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1989) 
also is misplaced. The plaintiff in Glenn simply filed an amended complaint without ever 
filing a motion for leave to amend. Id. at 369. Thus, there was no motion that could even 
arguably be construed as a motion under Rules 59 or 60. Thus, the court did not consider 
whether such a motion would be upheld since the plaintiff had not filed "any other 
motion." Id. at 371. 
National's citation to Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976) changes nothing. 
The plaintiff in Nichols waited nine months after a motion to dismiss was granted before 
seeking to amend its complaint. See id- at 232. Thus, the motion was untimely under 
Rules 59 or 60. That is not the case here. 
2. The Trial Court Had Broad Discretion to Grant the Motion. 
The foregoing demonstrates that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the 
Crawfords' motion. According to controlling authority, the trial court had broad 
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discretion to grant the motion. The liberal amendment policy of Utah R. Civ. P. 15 
applies to motions brought under Utah R. Civ. P. 13(d). See Four Seasons Solar Products 
Corp. v Sun System Prefabricated Solar Greenhouses, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 292, 294 
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(e), which, as noted by National, is 
substantially similar to Utah R. Civ. P. 13(d)). Thus, the trial court had broad discretion 
to allow the addition of the Crawfords' counterclaim under 13(d). See Insurance 
Concepts, Inc. v. Western Life Ins. Co., 639 F.2d 1108, 1114 (5th Cir. 1981); Aviation 
Materials, Inc. v. Pinney, 65 F.R.D. 357 (N.D. Ok. 1975). The trial court's grant of the 
Crawfords' motion must not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion 
resulting in prejudice to National. See Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, P 38, 57 P.3d 
997; R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus.. 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997). National 
has not made, and cannot make, this showing. 
3. The Crawfords Could Not Pursue Their Counterclaim Until 
December 12,2003. 
A counterclaim is not "mature" under Utah R. Civ. P. until all the elements of the 
claim exist. See Stahl v. Ohio River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1970). Thus, it is 
improper to allow the addition of a counterclaim before all the elements of that claim 
exist. See Union Nat. Bank of Youngstown, Ohio v. Universal- Cyclops Steel Corp., 103 
F.Supp. 719 (W.D.Pa. 1952) (holding that a claim for wrongful proceeding could not be 
brought under the equivalent of Rule 13(d) because an element of the claim was not 
established). National argues that the Brad Crawford's August 7, 1996 notice proves that 
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all of the elements of the Crawfords' counterclaim existed as of that date. National is 
wrong. The notice proves only that Brad Crawford believed that National had breached 
the Lease. Mr. Crawford's personal subjective belief does not constitute a "mature" 
claim under Rule 13(d). The claim did not mature until much later. 
The Crawfords' counterclaim sought recovery of income the Crawfords because 
National refused to remove its sign by October 23, 1996, and instead applied for and 
obtained a competing permit, which prevented the Crawfords from erecting their own 
sign and collecting rent from advertisers. A prerequisite to this claim was a valid sign 
pemiit. Without a valid pemiit, the Crawfords could not erect a sign. The validity of the 
Crawfords' permit was not conclusively established until this Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision on October 9, 2003. R. 811-12. At that point, the Crawfords' 
counterclaim matured. The Crawfords pursued this claim as soon as they could; 11 
calendar days after the matter was remitted. R. 809, 814-15. The trial court properly 
concluded that allowing the Crawfords to add their counterclaim was proper under these 
circumstances. 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reached 
the same conclusion under similar circumstances in Chapin & Chapin. Inc. v. McShane 
Contracting Co.. Inc., 374 F.Supp 1191 (W.D.Pa. 1974). Chapin involved a contract 
between a contractor and subcontractor which stated that the subcontractor's concrete 
work had to be accepted by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PDOT"). 
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The subcontractor sued to recover past due amounts. The contractor counterclaimed for 
sub-par work. In the middle of trial, the contractor learned that there were issues with the 
subcontractors work and that PDOT would perform tests to determine whether it would 
accept the concrete. The trial proceeded on the other issues and a final order was entered. 
Thereafter, PDOT rejected the subcontractor's concrete, and the contractor moved 
to amend its complaint to include a counterclaim for the cost of replacing the concrete. 
The trial court granted the motion, holding that the claim had not matured until after the 
trial. Id. at 1198. In doing so, the court stated: 
[W]e do not feel that the claim of [the contractor] had matured; since it's 
claim was based upon the failure of [the subcontractor] to put down 
sufficient concrete, there still remained the preliminary matter which had to 
be determined before the claim matured. This was whether or not the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania through [PDOT] would make a finding 
that there was such a material violation of the specifications as would 
constitute a breach of contract by [contractor] to which [contractor] could 
look for indemnity from [subcontractor]. 
Id. 
Just as the contractor in Chapin did not have a mature claim until PDOT rejected 
the subcontractor's concrete, the Crawfords did not have a mature claim until this Court 
validated their pemiit. As in Chapin, this did not happen until after an adjudication of the 
other issues in the case. Like the Chapin court, the trial court in this case properly 
exercised its discretion in granting the Crawfords' motion. 
4. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion. 
The foregoing provides a sufficient basis for finding that the trial court did not 
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abuse its discretion. Additional support also exists. The widely-recognized policy 
underlying Rule 13 is that closely related claims should be tried together to spare the 
parties and the judicial system the "diseconomies of multiple proceedings." Harbor Ins. 
Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1990). Obviously, the 
Crawfords' counterclaim is closely related to the parties5 respective claims seeking 
validating of their competing permits. If the trial court had not granted the Crawfords' 
motion, the Crawfords would have had to file a separate lawsuit to assert their newly-
mature claims. This multiplicity of actions is precisely what Rule 13 is intended to 
prevent See Cold Metal Prods. Co. v. Crucible Steel Co.. 126 F. Supp 546, 551 (D.N.J. 
1954) ("The purpose of [the federal equivalent of Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 13(d)] is to 
provide a means for complete litigation in one action of all claims . . . and thus avoid a 
multiplicity of actions"). The trial court properly exercised its discretion to avoid such a 
waste of time and judicial resources.2 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT NATIONAL 
BREACHED THE LEASE. 
National argues that the trial court erroneously found that National breached the 
Lease. National is wrong. Abundant evidence supports the trial court's finding. 
Paragraph 9 of the Lease clearly states that if the Property was going to be 
2Even if the Crawfords had asserted their non-mature counterclaim at the beginning 
of this case, the claims would have sat dormant throughout the proceedings until the this 
Court resolved the issue of whose pemiit was valid. Thus, National suffered no prejudice 
as a result of the trial court's granting of the Crawfords' motion. 
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improved such that the sign had to be removed, National had to remove it within 90 days 
of receiving written notice and a copy of the building permit. The evidence at trial 
established that: (1) the Crawfords decided to build an office building on the Property (the 
"Building"); (2) it was imperative that the Crawfords provided parking spaces sufficient 
to accommodate the parking needs of the Building's tenants; (3) if National did not 
remove its sign, four spaces that were necessary to provide adequate parking would be 
lost; (4) the Crawfords' gave National written notice to remove its sign, and a copy of the 
building permit, by July 25, 1996; (5) National, therefore, had to remove its sign by 
October 23, 1996; and (6) National did not remove its sign by October 23, 1996, but 
instead applied for and obtained a competing permit, which prevented the Crawfords 
from erecting their own sign and collecting rent from advertisers. R. 946, pp. 3-9. Based 
on this evidence, the trial court found: 
1. The Crawfords satisfied all prerequisites for terminating the 
Lease pursuant to paragraph 9, and properly terminated the Lease, by 
providing National with: (1) the April 23 Notice; (2) the June 10 Notice; 
and (3) a copy of the Building Permit on July 25, 1996. 
2. Pursuant to paragraph 9, National was required to remove its 
sign from the Property within 90 days of receiving written notice of 
termination and a copy of the building permit. Thus, National was required 
to remove its sign from the Property by no later than October 23, 1996. 
3. National breached the Lease, and the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, by not removing its sign from the Property by 
October 23, 1996. 
R. 937. 
-/5-
These findings were supported by evidence discussed above. R. 946, pp. 3-9. In 
fact, because National did not introduce any contrary evidence, the trial court had no 
choice but to make these findings. Thus, National has not met its burden of proving that 
these findings were clearly erroneous and, therefore, the findings must be affirmed. See 
Roderick, 2002 UT at 84, If 2; Pena. 869 P.2d at 935-36.3 
National argues that it did not have to remove its sign because it could have been 
"relocated" such that it did not interfere with parking spaces for the Building. Some 
outdoor advertising leases indicate that if the property is going to be developed but the 
sign can be relocated, the property owner must give the sign company the option to move 
the sign. However, the Lease does not contain such a provision. Rather, paragraph 9 
states that if the sign interfered with the development of the Property, it had to be 
removed; it says nothing about relocation. Consequently, National's argument regarding 
relocation of the sign is irrelevant. 
3National argues that the Crawfords wanted National's sign removed so their permit 
would become effective. National cites no supporting evidence in this record because none 
exists. Although the Crawfords were under no obligation to do so, they tried to negotiate an 
agreement whereby National's sign could stay if it was moved. R. 946, p. 7, lines 11-23. 
However, National repeatedly refused to move the sign. R. 946, p. 7, lines 23-25; p. 8, lines 
4-6. The Crawfords applied for their own permit only after National's repeated refusal to 
move its sign, and they did so only because others had convinced them that it was in their 
best interest to apply for a permit so they could control the sign location. R. 946, p. 8, lines 
7-16. The Crawfords never intended to be an outdoor advertising company. To this day, 
they are not an outdoor advertising company. Rather, they lease the Property to another 
outdoor advertising company. R. 946, p. 12. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE CRAWFORDS 
WERE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES. 
National next argues that the trial court erroneously found that National's breach 
damaged the Crawfords. Again, National is wrong. As noted above, National had to 
remove its sign by October 23, 1996. The evidence presented at trial established that if 
National had done so, the Crawfords could have erected their own sign and collected 
lease payments beginning in November of 1996, which they were ready, willing and able 
to do. R. 946, p. 12, lines 20-25; p. 13, lines 1-5. This evidence also established that 
National refused to remove its sign by October 23, 1996, and instead applied for and 
obtained a competing permit that precluded the Crawfords from erecting their own sign 
until May of 2003. R. 946, p. 12, lines 5-15. 
After reviewing this evidence, the trial court found: 
As a result of National's breach of the Lease, and the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, the Crawfords were precluded from entering into the Second 
Lease, and receiving the monthly payment of $1,050 under the Second Lease, from 
November of 1996 to May of 2003. Consequently, National's breach of the Lease 
damaged the Crawfords by depriving them of 78 monthly rental payments of 
$1,050, for a total of $81,900. 
R. 938. Based on this finding, the Court entered judgment for the Crawfords in the 
amount of $81,900, plus prejudgment interest of $27,732.91 (from November 1, 1996 to 
October 25, 2004 [the date of the Court's minute entry] at the rate of 10% pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2)), for a total of $109,632.91, plus post-judgment interest at 
the rate of 3.38% pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(3). R. 938. 
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Obviously, the trial court's finding and resulting judgment are supported by the 
evidence discussed above. In fact, once again, the trial court's finding was essentially 
mandated because National did not introduce any contrary evidence. Consequently, 
National has again failed to show that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous. As 
a result, this finding should be affirmed. See Roderick. 2002 UT at 84, f 2; Pena, 869 
P.2dat935-36.4 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Crawfords respectfully request that this Court affirm 
the trial court's: (1) granting of the Crawfords' motion for leave to amend; (2) the trial 
4National argues that its breach was excused because its actions were based on permits 
issued by Murray City and the Utah Department of Transportation, and an initial erroneous 
ruling from the trial court that was later reversed. Apparently, National contends that even 
though it refused to remove its sign by October 23, 1996 as required by the Lease, it cannot 
be held responsible for the Crawfords' damages because Murray City and the trial court 
initially condoned the breach. However, the trial court eventually found that National's 
permit was "null and void," a finding that was affirmed by this Court. R. 799, 811-12. "Null 
and void" means "that which binds no one or is incapable of giving rise to any rights or 
obligations under any circumstances, or that which is of no effect." Black's Law Dictionary, 
937 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991). If something is null and void, it is "as though it had not taken 
place [and] has absolutely no legal force or effect." Id. (defining the word "nullity"). 
Because National's permit does not give rise to any legal rights and must be treated as though 
it never existed, National cannot rely on it as a defense to the Crawfords' claims. Nor can 
National use its "null and void" permit to justify collecting and retaining tens of thousands 
or dollars in rent on the Sign, which should never have been erected. 
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court's: (1) finding that National breached the Lease; and (3) finding that the Crawfords 
were entitled to damages from National. 
August 25, 2005. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
*R. Stephen Marshall 
Steve K. Gordon 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 13, Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim 
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's 
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court 
cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the 
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the 
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by which the court 
did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is 
not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim 
against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-
matter of the opposing party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not 
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding 
in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party. 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either 
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with the permission 
of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through 
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may by leave of 
court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim 
by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that 
is the subject-matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the 
party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of 
a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties other than 
those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination 
of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants 
as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim maybe 
rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the opposing party 
have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
(i) Cross demands not affected by assignment or death. When cross demands have 
existed between persons under such circumstances that, if one had brought an action against 
the other, a counterclaim could have been set up, the two demands shall be deemed 
compensated so far as they equal each other, and neither can be deprived of the benefit 
thereof by the assignment or death of the other, except as provided in Subdivision (j) of this 
rule. 
(j) Claims against assignee. Except as otherwise provided by law as to negotiable 
instruments and assignments of accounts receivable, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim 
which could have been asserted against an assignor at the time of or before notice of such 
assignment, maybe asserted against his assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, 
or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a 
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in 
response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original 
pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may 
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to 
amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will 
be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 
of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental 
pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since 
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even 
though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If 
the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it 
shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or 
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one 
of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 
days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a 
motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The 
opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. 
The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be 
extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have 
granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of 
the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, 
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the 
appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 13. Counterclaim and Cross-Claim 
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing 
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third 
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the 
claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another 
pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or 
other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal 
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 
13. 
(b) Permissive Counterclaims. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any 
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim Exceeding Opposing Claim. A counterclaim may or may not 
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief 
exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing 
party. 
(d) Counterclaim Against the United States. These rules shall not be construed 
to enlarge beyond the limits now fixed by law the right to assert counterclaims or to claim 
credits against the United States or an officer or agency thereof. 
(e) Counterclaim Maturing or Acquired After Pleading. A claim which either 
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving a pleading may, with the permission 
of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental pleading. 
(f) Omitted Counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, the 
pleader may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
(g) Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any 
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is 
the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to 
any property that is the subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may 
include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the 
cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(h) Joinder of Additional Parties. Persons other than those made parties to the 
original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with 
the provisions of Rules 19 and 20. 
(i) Separate Trials; Separate Judgments. If the court orders separate trials as 
provided in Rule 42(b), judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered in 
accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b) when the court has jurisdiction so to do, even if 
the claims of the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
